The Foreign Loan Guarantee and Mutual Assistance Fund of the Conseil de l’Entente by Vignaud, Jean-Pierre Andre
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 4
Issue 2 Summer 1971 Article 2
The Foreign Loan Guarantee and Mutual
Assistance Fund of the Conseil de l’Entente
Jean-Pierre Andre Vignaud
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vignaud, Jean-Pierre Andre (1971) "The Foreign Loan Guarantee and Mutual Assistance Fund of the Conseil de l’Entente," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol4/iss2/2
The Foreign Loan Guarantee
and Mutual Assistance Fund
of the Conseil de l'Entente
JEAN-PIERRE ANDRE VIGNAUD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta, five French-
speaking West African countries, are the members of the Entente Group,
a political and technical regional organization which was formed in
1959. In June 1966, they created the Foreign Loan Guarantee and Mutual
Assistance Fund. The major purpose of this Fund is to provide a multi-
national guarantee to foreign loans, designed to finance new enterprises
conducted by local investors and deemed to contribute to the economic
growth of one or several countries of the Group. Furthermore, since
1967, the first year of actual operation, the Fund has encouraged and
sponsored different kinds of initiatives serving the long-term goal of
economic integration in the area.
The regional approach which underlies the creation of the Fund, the
fact that for the first time capital-importing countries grant some sort
of financial guarantee to foreign capital, and the fast and simple reim-
bursement which is offered through the Fund to foreign lenders bring
interesting innovations to the field of legal protection of foreign invest-
ments in developing countries.
*LL.M., Cornell (1970); U. of Paris: License en droit public (1968), Diplome
d'Etudes. Superieures (1969).
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The last twenty years have seen substantial changes in the problem of
protection of capital invested in developing countries. For a long period
of time, the international community suffered from a relative lack of
effective financial and legal remedies. The effectiveness of diplomatic
protection first depended upon whether or not a given country had suf-
ficient power to intimidate those responsible for the takings and, second,
upon whether or not it was willing to use this power in a particular in-
stance. Unwillingness to press a claim was illustrated by the attitude of
the French government of the late 1920's and the early 1930's when the
bolshevik authorities refused to reimburse the holders of bonds which
had been issued by the czarist regime. Likewise, the French government
did not really react to the takings that immediately followed the in-
dependence of Tunisia and Algeria.'
Since the late 1950's, however, capital-importing and capital-exporting
countries as well as international organizations have shown deep con-
cern towards the problem of legal protection of foreign investments. The
reasons for this trend are simple: the needs of developing countries in
capital and technology are so huge that they cannot be satisfied by local
resources alone or by the relatively limited amount of aid which is granted
by wealthier nations or by international organizations. Consequently,
almost all developing countries seek to attract an inflow of foreign capital
in the form of either direct or portfolio investments. This is true even
in those countries where the economic program of development is not
a capitalistic one. Ghana and Tanzania, for instance, nationalized the
key sectors of their economy but are calling for foreign investments in
other branches of their industry.
However, the legitimate fear of any kind of political domination from
abroad and of any type of venture that could lead to a resurging coloniza-
tion has caused some countries to deter the flow of foreign capital either
by expropriation without adequate compensation or by some kind of
discriminatory treatment.
Where this conflict between economic needs and political concerns
exists, the commercial atmosphere looks unattractive, and foreign in-
vestors often avoid undertaking ventures in spite of potentially profitable
business opportunities.
In order to make the commercial climate more attractive to foreign
investors, significant efforts have recently been made at all levels by
the international community. At the national level, some of the most
important capital-exporting countries such as the United States, Japan,
and Germany have set up a system of financial insurance for domestic
1. M. GONIDEC, COUPS D'INSTITUTIONS PuBLIQuEs AFRIcAINES Er MALGACHES 89 (1967).
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capital invested abroad.2 The insurance policy usually covers different
kinds of noncommercial risks and may be purchased for the major types
of investments. It is restricted to investments that are made in a country
which has previously signed a bilateral agreement with the exporting
country.
In order to improve the investment climate, most of the host countries
have enacted domestic legislation rather favorable to foreign capital.
Among the provisions to which foreign investors pay most attention are
those dealing with the financial incentives - including tax exemptions,
domestic ownership requirements, and the law of expropriation. 3
The practice of bilateral treaties dealing with this problem has long
been used by the Anglo-American States. Since the end of World War II,
the United States, for instance, has entered into more than twenty treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation under which national treat-
ment is granted to individuals and companies of both parties and ade-
quate compensation expressly provided for in case of nationalization or
expropriation. 4
The problem of the protection of private investments abroad has also
been treated by several worldwide international organizations. Three
main directions have been followed:
First, certain private or public organizations have tried to set forth
or to codify the international customary law regarding the treatment of
private property.5 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, for instance, has been working on the problem for more than
twenty years and has published two draft conventions on the protection
of foreign property.6
2. United States Investment Guarantee Program, 22 U.S.C. § 2181 (1964). Sum-
maries of the Japanese and the German systems may be found in Brewer, The Proposal
for Investment Guarantees by an International Agency, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 62 (1964).
3. E.g., The Philippine Incentive Acts set forth an elaborate system under which, in
order to take advantage of the "registered enterprises" incentives, an enterprise must
have at least 60% of its stock held by Philippine citizens. See C. FULDA AND W.
SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 585 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 1839,
T.IA.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 53.
5. Some of the most significant accomplishments in this field are: (1) the Inter-
national Code for Fair Treatment of Foreign Investments prepared by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, I.C.C. Brochure No. 129 (April, 1949); (2> the
International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private Property Rights in
Foreign Countries (draft ed., Nov., 1957), cited in Miller, Protection of Private Foreign
Investment by Multilateral Conversion, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 371-78 (1959); and (3)
the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens (12th draft, 1961), cited in Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries
to the Economic Interest of Aliens, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 545, 548-84 (1961).
6. See O.E.C.D. PUB. No. 15637, App. B. (Dec. 1962>. Under Art. 3 of the
Draft Convention, the taking by a state of private property owned by nationals of
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Second, a Centre for the Settlement of International Investment Dis-
putes was created in 1965 under the auspices of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.). The Centre provides
an international forum for the settlement of disputes directly related
to an investment in which a State is a party to a suit by a national of
another State. Thus far, the Convention has been ratified by 62
countries.7
Third, the I.B.R.D. has been working for three years on a project
to create an International Investment Insurance Agency which would
offer, at the international level, the same kind of financial guarantee that
is granted by certain capital-exporting countries. This project is still in
the draft stage.8
The regional framework has also been used to deal with the problem.
An illustration of this approach in French-speaking Africa is the West
Africa Entente Group (Conseil de l'Entente), organized in 1959 to pro-
mote political and economic cooperation in the area. The 1959 Agree-
ment mainly deals with technical matters such as customs problems and
the avoidance of double taxation. The Agreement also contained two
important provisions dealing with economic problems.0 One, which
envisaged the harmonization of the development plans, has never been
put into effect. The second, providing for the establishment of a Solidarity
Fund, reflected an acknowledgement by Ivory Coast that it was in its
interest to share its relative prosperity with its partners of the Group.
The Fund was to receive 10% of the revenues of each state, but its opera-
tion ceased in 1963.10
An attempt at integration took place when Mr. Houphouet Boigny
launched the idea of double nationality; this proposal found its origin
in the fact that many workers were traveling to the Ivory Coast to find
other party states is allowed only where (i) the measures are taken in the public interest
and under due process of law, (ii) the measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any
undertaking which the former party may have agreed to, (iii) the measures are ac-
companied by provision for the payment of just, speedy, and effective compensation.
See also E. NWOGUGu, THE LEGAL, PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEvELOPING
CouNTuEs 152 (1965).
7. TiRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTE FOR SETrLEMENI OF INVEST-
MENTS DisPUTs 5 (1968-1969).
8. The Agency would be authorized to issue insurance upon payment of premiums
against noncommercial risks for new investments which (i) are proposed for insurance
by a Member State, (ii) are to be made in a host country and approved by it, (iii> are
developmental in character. See Stikker, The Role of Private Enterprise in Investment
and Promotion of Exports in Developing Countries, UNCTAD TD/35/Rev. 1, at 37(1968.
9. Ratified by Dahomey on April 11, 1968 (ordinance) ; by Ivory Coast on Nov. 20,
1967 (decree); by Niger on Dec. 3, 1966 (decree) ; by Togo on Sept. 25, 1968 (ordi-
nance); and by Upper Volta on Aug. 29, 1967 (decree).
10. Arts. 5 and 6 of the 1959 Convention.
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jobs and were applying for Ivorian citizenship. The proposal was not
adopted mainly because of the vigorous opposition from Ivorian workers
who feared the loss of their employment.
The first important accomplishment in the economic sphere was the
establishment in June 1966 of the Loan Guarantee and Mutual As-
sistance Fund. In connection with the Fund, the major questions to be
considered are: What considerations induced the Members of the Group
to create the Fund? What is its nature and its structure? How does it
work? What actual results have been obtained thus far? What is the place
of the Fund in the domestic legal systems of the Member States and the
international legal order? Does the guarantee created therein duplicate
any other financial protection granted elsewhere? Could the guarantee be
extended to other forms of investments or to a larger geographical area?
How can the Fund contribute to the economic integration of the five
economies?
II. THE DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS
A. THE NEED FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL
The need to attract foreign capital in the area of the Group is a direct
consequence of two basic economic facts. First, financing by domestic
resources is still inadequate. Second, official international aid is insuf-
ficient and irregular from year to year.
The inadequacy of domestic sources of financing can be described
briefly. It has been calculated that on the assumption of a total formation
of capital equivalent to 20% of the gross national products, the average
growth rate of the African countries (South Africa excluded) would
reach the level of 5.9% in 1980.11 This implies, of course, considerable
structural change - especially in West Africa where the current rates
of domestic savings are still very low.12 This particular problem has ap-
peared as a very serious one when these countries have faced the problem
of financing their plans of development. Public and private savings are
expected to finance 70% of the total planned investment program in
Ghana whereas the percentage goes down to 55% in Ivory Coast, 24%
in Upper Volta, and 19% in Niger.13 It should be added that, in the
Entente Group area as in the whole of French-speaking Africa, the prob-
lem of the scarcity of domestic savings is aggravated by the existence of
1I. EWING, INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 94 (1968).
12. RAPPORT JEANNENEY, L'AIDE FRANCAISE Aux PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT,
ANNEX B (1963).
13. S. CARLSON AND 0. OLAKANPO, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN PLAN-
NING WEST AFRICA 56 (1964).
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a substantial outflow of private capital to France. Although it is difficult
to gauge it accurately because of the freedom of transfers within the
Franc Zone, some experts estimate this outflow at around 2% to 3% of
the gross national product.14
Some valuable attempts have been made among the Members of the
Group to increase domestic savings and to finance public and private
investments through domestic financial channels. Two examples of such
efforts can be found in Niger and in the Ivory Coast.
Niger has used a very simple technique - the voluntary bond issue.'5
A statute passed in December 1961 created a Development Bank which
is authorized to issue public bonds during a 15-year period and up to a
limit of two billion francs CFA.' 6 The bonds are guaranteed by the gov-
ernment of Niger. The Bank has been moderately successful thus far:
350 million francs CFA were subscribed from 1964 to 1966.
A more sophisticated technique has been used by Ivory Coast.17 In fact,
the borrowing policy of this country mixes choice with compulsion. The
National Fund of Investment is provided with capital from a certain per-
centage of the earnings of individuals and corporations involved in cer-
tain industrial or real estate ventures. The National Society of Financing
tries to mobilize domestic funds by issuing voluntary bonds. From 1963
to 1966 there was one issue per year, and the average product has been
130 million francs CFA.
The goal of this mechanism is twofold. It is designed, first, to mobilize
funds by making it compulsory for the individuals and the corporations
to reinvest in the Ivorian economy part of their earnings. Second, the
Fund invests its resources in those sectors of the economy deserving a top
priority. However, each individual retains title to his contribution to the
Fund and can even purchase it back if he can prove that he has invested
in one of those designated sectors or is in the process of earning income
from an investment in one of them.
Because of the insufficiency of domestic savings, the countries of the
Entente Group, like all less developed countries, have to rely on inter-
national capital. In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish the major
techniques of international financial transfers to developing countries;
besides the traditional channel of private investments, there is a substan-
tial flow of official capital - bilateral and multilateral - granted or
loaned at low rates by industrialized countries or international organiza-
tions. We may first ask whether these five countries can rely on sufficient
14. Id. at 52.
15. Vinay, les Etats Africains et Malgache et la mobilisation de l'epargne par 1'em-
prunt, 76 REcUEIL PENANT 30 (1966).
16. 1 franc CFA = 0.02 franc Metrapole. 1 American dollar = 275 francs CFA.
17. Vinay, supra note 15, at 43.
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bilateral or multilateral financial aid to meet their development needs.
The evolution of bilateral aid has not been favorable to French-
speaking African countries. The net development assistance rose sub-
stantially each year from 1959 to 1962, but over the last seven years one
finds "an annual average increase of DAC (Development Assistance
Committee) official assistance of 1.4%, a very modest rate of increase in
real terms, if any."'8 This mediocre trend is dominated by the stagnation
of the flow of financial assistance from the major donor countries. The
stagnation of the French official assistance is particularly significant,
and the countries of the Franc Zone have suffered from it.
The second form of official assistance is provided through multi-
national agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Development Association, and the Inter-
national Finance Corporation. But, here again, the West African coun-
tries cannot expect much help. As a matter of fact, it appears from the
1969 annual report of the World Bank Group that Upper Volta, Togo,
and Dahomey are the three countries that have received the least assis-
tance since the World Bank Group was created. 19
It is thus clear that the five countries of the Entente Group need to
draw a substantial inflow of nonofficial capital. Aware of this economic
necessity, they have long sought to create a favorable climate for foreign
private capital.
Nothing can be found in any of the countries' constitutions dealing
specifically with the treatment of foreign property; these constitutions
are derived from the 1958 French constitution which does not contain
any such provisions. Each of the Member Countries, however, has en-
acted an investment code.20 These codes carry a wide variety of economic
incentives, ranging from tax and import duty exemptions to guarantee
of minimum sales. Besides the availability of such incentives, however,
foreign investors are highly interested in the legal protection of their
capital; this involves not only the right to fair compensation in case of
expropriation but also guarantees against any kind of creeping ex-
propriation.
The first express right granted to foreigners is the "right to freely
transfer all profits and invested capital in case of closure or cessation of
operations." This provision, contained in Art. 2 of the code of Dahomey,
exists in three other codes with some variations.
18. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, EFFORTS AND POLICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOP-
MENT ASSISTANCE COwiMrE 44 (1969).
19. 1969 WORLD BANK GRoUP ANN. REP. 24.
20. Dahomey, Statute No. 61-53 (Dec. 1961); Ivory Coast, Statute No. 59-134 (Sept.
1959), completed by Decree No. 60-9 (Jan. 1960); Niger, Statute No. 61-21 (July
1961) ; Togo Statute No. 65-36 (July 1965) ; Upper Volta Statute Nos. 62-14 and 62-55
(Dec. 1962).
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As a general rule, the codes ban any kind of discriminatory treatment
against foreigners. But it is noteworthy that these provisions usually re-
main very vague. In practice, close attention is paid to this matter in
the "contracts of establishment" (convention d'etablissement), which are
signed between the government of the host country and those foreign in-
vestors who are willing to take advantage of the incentives program;
specific rights such as assurance to foreign manufacturers that they will
be treated on an equal footing with national enterprises by the ad-
ministrative agencies are spelled out at this stage. Dahomey and Niger
have introduced the so-called "stabilization rule" under which a foreign
investor may be granted the right not to be subject to later modification
of the domestic law.21
With regard to the law of expropriation, the codes themselves do not
say much; the Dahomey statute is the only one which specifically pro-
vides for "equitable compensation in case of expropriation." Apparently,
this question was purposely kept outside the scope of the codes, for a
distinction was made between the law of incentives and basic guarantees
offered to desirable foreign investments and the general policy of each
country regarding the problem of expropriation. In other words, the
only purpose of the codes was to lay down technical incentives and ob-
ligations for foreign enterprises.
The five members of the Group have entered into a series of bilateral
treaties or agreements with developed countries regarding the treatment
of foreign capital. A good example of this type of agreement is to be
found in the United States investment guarantee program by which the
American government, through the Agency for International Develop-
ment, offers United States investors financial guarantees against political
risks.
These agreements help to create a favorable climate for investments
of foreign capital even though their scope is rather limited. None of the
five countries has entered a treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion with the United States. But Togo does have a treaty of amity and
economic relations which was signed in 1966 and entered into force on
1967.22
None of the five countries except Ivory Coast has made a public state-
ment of policy regarding the treatment of foreign capital according to
21. Art. 29 of the Dahomean code and Art. 16 of the code of Niger. These provisions,
however, do not have much legal value since the legislatures could easily overrule
them. See Delaume, Des Stipulations de Droit Applicable les Accords de Prt et de
Developpement Economique et le leur Rdle, REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 336
(1968).
22. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the United States and Togo,
Feb. 8, 1966, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193.
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customary international law on expropriation. We can observe, however,
the position they have taken in international organizations. First, and
as a matter of course, they all voted in favor of both the 1962 and the
1966 Resolutions of the United Nations Assembly on the permanent
sovereignty of a country over its natural resources. 23 These votes, though,
are not very significant since, from them, one cannot draw any other
conclusion than the existence of apparent cohesion among the countries
of the developing world. More significant is the rapidity with which
they signed the Convention setting up the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes.24 It should be noted that they were
among the very first States to sign it, whereas many less developed
countries (especially all Latin American countries) have not done so thus
far. The adhesion to the arbitration procedure set forth by the Conven-
tion constitutes a substantial step forward in the process undertaken by
the Entente Group members to create a more attractive climate for
foreign capital. This is true even though the actual jurisdiction of the
Centre is based purely on consent and results from the agreement of the
parties to invoke it by means of a "compromise (agreement to submit to
arbitration), an arbitration clause, or a unilateral declaration by a
State followed by acceptance by the investor." 25
B. THE ATEMPT TO CONCILIATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
All these endeavors to create a climate of confidence show a desire for
an inflow of foreign capital into the area. The Members of the Entente
Group, however, like many other less developed countries, feel that the
presence of an excessive amount of direct investments may threaten
their political and economic independence. Thus, the relevant questions
are: What forms of investment best suit the needs of these economies?
What financial and legal techniques can be used to achieve this goal?
The study of the reasoning which led the Members of the Group to set
up the Guarantee Fund and the study of the techniques used in the
operation of the Fund will help to answer those questions.
Sharp criticism can be lodged against foreign private investments in
infant economies. Over 80% of the flow of private capital to West
23. GA. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962);
G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
24. Dahomey, Sept. 10, 1965 (effective Oct. 14, 1966); Ivory Coast, June 30, 1965(effective Oct. 14, 1966); Niger, Aug. 23, 1965 (effective Dec. 14, 1966) ; Togo, Jan. 24,
1966 (effective Sept. 10, 1967); Upper Volta, Sept. 16, 1965 (effective Oct. 14, 1966).
25. Kahn, The Law Applicable to Foreign Investment, the Contribution of the World
Bank Convention on the Settlement of International Disputes, 44 IND. L. J. 1, 5 (1968-
1969).
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Africa has, in recent years, been in the form of direct investment, as
opposed to portfolio investments. 26 Regarding this phenomenon, modern
economic analysis shows that, from the host country's viewpoint, the
value of foreign direct investments could be maximized only if the three
following principles are recognized and applied.27
The first principle would be the willingness of investors to Africanize
their enterprises by training skilled workers and local managers.
Second, investors must acknowledge the need for local industrializa-
tion. Foreign capital has long been invested almost exclusively in trading
activities, extractive industries, and primary commodities plantations.
These activities usually require little processing and hence have little
beneficial impact on the local economy, for as a general rule, the more
local processing and manufacturing an investment involves, the more
profitable it is for the overall economy.
The third principle calls for at least some minimum participation by
local interests. This is a very delicate issue because foreign ventures may
be discouraged by too strict regulations in this matter. No precise answer
can be given "in abstracto" as to the minimum participation that should
be offered to local investors. The requirements, if any, are usually
spelled out in investment codes. The Philippine Incentives Act, for in-
stance, sets forth an elaborated system under which to take advantage
of the "registered enterprises" incentives, 60% of a corporation's stock
must be held by Philippine citizens and 60% of the corporation's board
of directors must be Philippines. 28
The observer of West African economic problems may feel that foreign
capital is very necessary but, in many instances, is not employed in a way
that maximizes its usefulness. It was recently said that "while there is
a continuing need for infrastructure investments in the area, such
projects do not easily attract foreign capital."29 On the other hand, there
is little difficulty in attracting foreign concerns to the service sector,
where business could more readily be run by local enterprises.
Several courses of action have been suggested to solve the problem
of maximizing the usefulness of foreign capital.
The most daring suggestion was enunciated by an African economist,
Antoine Lawrence, who proposed the creation of a special fund designed
26. Helleiner, New Forms of Foreign Investment in Africa, 6 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN
STuDiEs 17 (1968).
27. G. BENVENISTE AND W. MORAN, AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 112 (1962).
28. Philippine Investment Incentives Act, § 3 (B), as reported in C. FULDA AND IV.
SCHwARTZ, Supra note 8.
29. Mitchell, Foreign Investment in Africa, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (Mar.
1970).
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to promote African participation in new foreign investments. 30 This fund
would be financed initially by contributions from both African and de-
veloped countries and would be used to provide for equity capital to
selected foreign investments. The shares thus acquired by the fund would
be placed at the disposal of Africans.3'
On a narrower scale, some West African countries, such as Liberia and
Nigeria, have created Investment or Industrial Banks, the purpose of
which are to assist in the establishment of new industrial enterprises.
32
The reasoning that led the Entente Group countries to create the
Foreign Loan Guarantee Fund is simple: foreign private capital inflows
are extremely desirable. Often times they are not oriented to sectors or
branches where they are most needed. Therefore, a substantial part of
the inflow should be diverted from direct ventures into loans. Hence, the
purpose of the Fund is to guarantee foreign capital loaned to local in-
vestors.
One might wonder why these countries do not try to borrow capital
from wealthier countries or from international organizations rather than
from private parties at what are probably higher rates. The answer is
to be found in the fact that loans from "public sources" do not always
suit the actual needs of the borrowing party; they are sometimes restricted
to certain categories of operations or to certain categories of borrowers
(States or public subsidiaries, for example). In other instances, they pro-
vide only for part of the planned investment. Consequently, it is neces-
sary to look for financial participation of private parties (especially
banks) whose funds can be better adapted to the demand and to the
nature of the borrowers.
III. HOW THE FUND PROTECTS FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IN MEMBER COUNTRIES
A. STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
The goals of the Fund are enunciated in the Preamble of the Conven-
tion portant creation du Fonds d'Entraide et de Garantie des Emprunts.
The Fund is designed, first, to promote the economic development of
30. G. BENVENISTE AND W. MORAN, supra note 27, at 101.
31. This fund would not duplicate the existing African Bank of Development which
is financed by public funds and designed to assist public investments exclusively.
32. E.g., the Liberian Bank for Industrial Development and Investment created in
Apr. 1960 and the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank created in Jan. 1964, 77
RECUEIL PENANT 172 (1967). The purpose of the Development Bank of Nigeria, for
instance, is "to stimulate indigeneous entrepreneurship by assisting financially"
(Art. 1 of its charter>. Where the size and the nature of the project warrants foreign
participation, the Bank works out financial aspects of collaboration. See also 12
NIGERIAN TRADE J. 91 (July-Sept. 1964).
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the Entente Group by appealing, as much as possible, to international
cooperation and by providing the greatest possible security to external
capital which will be invested in the area; 33 second, to accelerate and
coordinate the economic growth of the five member countries by setting
up a common organization which will contribute to the preparation and
the financing of common projects, to the enlargement of the market, and
also to avoidance of duplicate national projects. 34
The administrative structure of the Fund is relatively simple. Three
organs were created.
The Fund is administrated by the Council of the Chiefs of State of the
five countries.35 The Council meets at least once a year and is presided
over by the President of the Entente Group.36 It directs the activities of
the Fund, and its decisons are made by unanimous vote.37 During inter-
sessions, the Council delegates its authority to the Management Com-
mittee which is responsible to it.
The Management Committee is composed of two representatives of
each member state and is presided over by a representative from the
country whose head of state is at that time President of the Group.38 In
fact, the representatives are usually Ministers of Finance and Ministers
of Economic Planning.3 9 As in the Council, decisions are made by
unanimous vote. Art. 6, para. 1 of the Convention grants the Committee
the power to administer the Fund; it approves the applications for
guarantee, the semiannual financial statements, the annual budget, and
the annual report prepared by the Administrative Secretary.
The Administrative Secretary of the Fund is appointed by the Council
for an unspecified period of time.40 This is very unusual and probably
unique among international organizations. From the Secretary's stand-
point, this may be an advantage insofar as he can undertake long-run
action. But it may as well be a disadvantage since he may be removed at
any time "ad nutum" by the Council. His powers are defined in very
broad terms both in the Convention and in the bylaws. He receives,
examines, and presents applications for guarantee to the Committee.
Once a guarantee is granted, he follows the service of the debt. He pre-
pares all the documents necessary to the meetings of the Council and the
33. Preamble, paras. 1, 2, 3 and 5.
34. Preamble, paras. 1 and 4.
35. Convention, Art. 6, para. 1.
36. Convention, Art. 6, para. 2. Since 1968, the President has been Mr. M. H. Diori,
President of the Republic of Niger.
37. Convention, Art. 6, para. 5.
38. Convention, Art. 6, para. 3.
39. See LE FONDS D'ENTR'AIDE Er DE GARANTIE DES EMPRUNTS DU CONSEIL DE L'ENTENTE:
UN OUTIL DE PROMOTION ECONOMIQUE 2 (1968).
40. Bylaws, Art. 10.
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Committee,41 appoints and discharges the personnel of the Fund, and
determines wages.42 He also represents the Fund as regards third
parties. 43
From the nature and the respective powers of the three organs, it can
be inferred that they fulfill very distinct functions in the operation of
the Fund. The Secretary is in charge of the general management of the
Fund and of the preparation of the decisions, while the Committee acts
upon the decisions. It is the Council, however, which gives the Fund the
basic political and financial means for action.
It should be remembered that the proper operation of the organiza-
tion is dependent upon a unanimous agreement among the member
states; thus if one of the members were to withdraw or if a serious dis-
agreement were to arise among the States, the Fund would not be able
to grant future guarantees. The identical composition of the Conference
of the Chiefs of State of the Entente Group and of the Council of the
Fund indicates that the theoretical autonomy of the latter actually de-
pends upon the common willingness of the five governments to preserve
it. Two consequences follow this interdependence so far as the scope of
action of the Fund is concerned. It could be blocked or confined to
routine tasks, or it could also be enlarged. However, due to the willing-
ness of member states to make the Fund the cornerstone of economic co-
operation in the area, the latter possibility has prevailed thus far. It
should be further noted that the Council controls the financial power
of the organization since it determines the amount of annual contribution
of the members of the Fund.44
The Foreign Loan and Mutual Assistance Fund is financed through
four different channels which are listed in Art. 5 of the Convention.
The first channel is "an endowment constituted by annual contribu-
tions from the Member States. The amount of the contributions is
determined by the Council every five years."4 5 In the future, the amount
of the endowments will probably vary according to the needs of the
organization. However, in order to provide the Fund with substantial
financial capability rapidly, the Member States agreed to pay an excep-
tional annual contribution of 650 million francs CFA ($2.5 million)
during the first two years.46 The quotas were fixed as follows: Ivory
Coast, 500 million; Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta, 42 million each;
Togo, 24 million.47 In fact, at the end of the first two financial years,
41. Bylaws, Art. 14.
42. Bylaws, Art. 15.
43. Bylaws, Art. 16, para. 2.
44. Convention, Art. 5, para. 1.
45. Id.
46. Convention, Art. 5, para. 6.
47. Mallet Buisson, Garante aux investissements, celle qu'offrent maintenant les Etats
du Conseil de l'Entente, 1026 l'ECONOMIE 17 (1966).
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the Council decided to extend this "super contribution" for five addi-
tional years.48 The quotas remain the same as were fixed in 1966. The
amount of the contribution may seem insignificant, but it represents in
all cases a substantial share of the national budget (up to 1/10th in the
case of Dahomey).49 This is an additional indication of the confidence
and the expectations these countries have put in the Fund.
The second source of revenue is "miscellaneous endowments".50 Up
to now, the only endowment in cash made to the Fund came from
France, through the Aid and Cooperation Fund (ACF). This "unique
and nonrenewable" 100 million francs CFA ($400,000) contribution was
made in May, 1967.51 In addition to endowments in cash, the Fund tries
to obtain technical assistance with regard to the realization of multi-
national projects. In 1968, for instance, the American government
financed research conducted by Ford Machine Co. International to de-
velop new agricultural products.52
The third source of revenue for the Fund is "the proceeds of its in-
vestments".53 Actually the only proceeds received thus far by the Fund
under this chapter have been the interest from the bank which holds the
Fund's assets.
The proceeds of the guarantee granted to local investors constitutes
the last category of resource for the Fund.54 Art. 10 of the bylaws fixed an
upper limit of 0.50% on the premium which may be levied by the Fund
on the guaranteed loan.
Two characteristics of the financial organization of the Fund are
particularly noteworthy. First, the guarantee provided to foreign lenders
is pledged in cash, in French francs, deposited at "a financial institution
of international reputation". This offers security to the beneficiaries of
the guarantee. Second, it appears that the origin of the most significant
part of the resources of the Fund is African. This stresses the sense of
responsibility that has developed among the five Member Countries.
The Fund is a multinational organization created in the form of an
48. Resolution of the Council (Dec. 1968).
49. 1969 PsRsPcTrvFs NIGERIENNES 17.
50. Convention, Art. 5, para. 2.
51. HEAD ComMITEE OF THE AID AND THE CO-OPERATION FUND, REPORT ON MEETINGS
(May 30, 1967). "The Head Committee of the Aid and Co-operation Fund authorizes
the grant of a unique and non-renewable sum of 2 million Francs ($400,000) to the
Foreign Loan Guaranty and Mutual Assistance Fund of the Entente Group ... [andi
stipulates that this grant allows no further commitment and no liability of the ACF
towards creditors or beneficiaries of the guaranties."
52. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ACrmIVrTEs OF THE FUND 18 (1968). These studies are
designed to discover new possibilities for foreign investors to grow and transform
new agricultural products such as rice, tomatoes and different oil plants.
53. Convention, Art. 5, para. 8.
54. Convention, Art. 5, para. 5.
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"dtablissement public international A caractre financier, dot6 de la
personnalit6 civile et de l'autonomie financire". An "etablissement pub-
lic international" can be defined as an organization having an inter-
national status and autonomous powers and designed either to perform
services on behalf of private parties or to regulate the use of a state or
interstate property.55
The Fund meets all the characteristics of an "tablissement public in-
ternational". It was created by subjects of international law. It is designed
for a specific purpose which is spelled out in Art. 2 of the Convention:
"To guarantee the loans made by capital holders outside the area to
either States, public or semipublic organizations, or those private enter-
prises having their principal office and their principal place of business
in one or several Member Countries ... and ... to finance profitable or
infrastructure industrial, agricultural and commercial projects".5 6 It is
a legal entity.57 It has headquarters which are located in Abidjan.SS It
has its own organs and assets. Its agents enjoy the status of international
civil servants within the area of the Entente Group.59 The Fund itself
enjoys privileges and immunities in the territory of each Member State.60
The Fund, however, is not only subjected to international law. It seems
that nothing prevents a subsidiary application of the lex situs, here the
Ivorian law, when the principles of international law or the rules laid
down in the Convention are insufficient. This is the case, for instance,
with regard to the relationships of the Fund to its employees.
The benefits of the total guarantee granted by the Fund is unequally
portioned out among the Member Countries. Dahomey has received more
than half of the total amount whereas the Ivory Coast has not applied
for any guarantee. In fact, in 1966, the Ivory Coast officially declared it
would not apply for any guarantees during a 5-year period starting on
January, 1967. This decision constitutes a real effort to facilitate economic
cooperation within the Group. Ivorian leaders are aware of the fact that
it is in the interest of their country to assist in the economic growth of
the four partners. One might be disappointed by the fact that all guar-
anteed loans were heretofore designed to finance purely national invest-
ments. The reason for this is the great difficulty encountered in drawing
up multinational projects. The economic studies financed or managed by
the Fund are designed to overcome this obstacle.
55. H. ADAM, LFs ORGANISMES INTERNATIONAUX SPECIALISES 5 (1967).
56. The Fund has broadened the scope of its action.
57. Convention, Art. 1, para. 1.
58. Convention, Art. 1, para. 2.
59. Convention, Privileges and Immunities, Art. 8.
60. Convention, Privileges and Immunities, Art. 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10. These articles deal
with the inviolability of the assets of the Fund and the exemption of all taxes whatso-
ever within the territory of the member states.
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B. THE MECHANISM OF THE GUARANTEE
Unlike most existing national, bilateral, or multinational systems, the
Fund does not guarantee direct investments but only foreign loans de-
signed to finance direct investments. Also, unlike these other systems,
the guarantee covers not only the so-called political risks but also any
kind of failure to reimburse, whatever the reason.
In order to be eligible for the guarantee, a loan must be "productive",
"designed to finance industrial, agricultural or commercial projects.""'
The investment projects must meet certain conditions which are enun-
ciated in the bylaws.
First, they must be real investments. The definition of eligible invest-
ments, as stated in Art. 21 of the bylaws, is unusually broad: "No loan
will be guaranteed by the Fund except these intermediate and long-term
loans designed to finance investments in either the agricultural, in-
dustrial, touristic or commercial section. Investment means any necessary
expense, other than overhead expenses and cash in hand, necessary to
realize movable or immovable property." This broad concept is somewhat
similar to the one which has been spelled out in international congresses
on the problems of the economic growth of developing countries: "Any
enterprise, the result of which is to increase the economic ability of the
recipient country."6 2
Second, Art. 24 of the bylaws prevents the Fund from extending its
guarantee to investments that have already been realized or the realization
of which has begun. This provision is naturally designed to encourage
new investments.
Third, the proposed investment must meet minimum standards so far
as financing and foreseeable profitability are concerned. These standards
are spelled out in Arts. 22 and 28 of the bylaws and can be outlined as
follows.
The promoters of the investment must provide for a "reasonable"
amount of the necessary capital. In other words, the realization of a
project should not be entirely dependent upon foreign capital. No further
amount is specified as to the minimum that must be brought into the
business by the African investor. This is to be determined by the Com-
mittee on a case by case basis.
Also, the income generated by the investment must be sufficient to
61. Convention, Art. 2, paras. 1 and 2; and bylaws, Art. 21, para. 1.
62. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL CONFERENCE OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1967).
Kahn, Foreign Investments in the Developing Countries. REPORT OF THE 52ND CON-
FERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 835 (1966).
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provide for the financial balance of the business and for a reasonable
profit. Regarding public investments (infrastructure works, for instance),
the criteria of profitability are replaced by the concept of "financial
viability". Thus, it appears that a loan can be guaranteed only where
the related investment is deemed to be economically desirable and
financially sound. The Management Committee has great discretionary
power in this matter athough its decisions may be influenced by political
considerations.
Finally, the bylaws provide that projects dealing with two or more
Member Countries shall have priority over purely national projects. 6 3
However, this principle has not yet been implemented.
The Fund grants its guarantee to transnational loans exclusively.
Since the five countries have retained the French commercial law which
was applicable at the day of their independence, the legal definition of
"transnational loans" that prevails is the one given by the French tri-
bunals. 64 According to a 12-year old decision of the Cour de Cassation,
transnational loans require a "double movement of capital across the
borders" regardless of the domicile or the nationality of the parties.0 5
So far as the lenders are concerned, the Convention simply says that
"the Fund shall guarantee only those loans made by persons outside the
area of the Entente Group."66 Art. 20 of the bylaws reiterates this require-
ment by stating that "in no case shall the guarantee be granted
to either citizens or residents of any of the Member Countries." However,
nothing is said with regard to the legal nature of the lenders; they may
be public or private corporations or financial institutions. So far, the
lenders have been two French corporations, three French banks (two
public banks and one private bank), two groupings of Italian banks,
and one German bank.
The borrowers are "the States, the public corporations and the private
enterprises having their main office and their principal place of business
in one or several Member States." 67 It seems that the drafters of the Con-
vention were primarily concerned with the economic location of the bor-
rower rather than his nationality. At a consequence of this, there seems
to be no reason why the African subsidiary of a foreign group could not
obtain a guarantee on the merits of the proposed venture.
63. Bylaws, Art. 27.
64. Dahomey, Art. 76; Ivory Coast, Art. 76; Niger, Art. 76; Togo, Art. 88, para. 3;
Upper Volta, Art. 76. P. GONm e, DRorrs AFRICAINS EVOLUTION ET SouRcEs 35 (1968.
65. C. Cass. civ. com. Nov. 4, 1958, Ph. Malanries note, REc. DALLOZ 361 (1959).
This rather strict definition was given by the French Cour de Cassation in a case
where the question of the validity of a gold clause was involved. This definition
might, however, be interpreted by African Courts in a way that would not make
the repatriation of the loan an obligation.
66. Convention, Art. 2, para. 1.
67. Id.
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Nothing specific can be found either in the Convention or the bylaws
as to the form the loan should take. The only information which can be
found in this respect is the reference in Art. 2 of the Convention to
"issued or contracted loans". We can conclude from the vagueness of
this provision that the loans eligible for the guarantee of the Fund may
take the form either of a usual loan agreement, commercial papers (bil-
let t ordre), or bonds. One might raise the question as to whether con-
vertible bonds could be guaranteed; theoretically, nothing prevents this.
However, this is unlikely to happen at least in the near future since a
convertible bond constitutes for the bondholder a virtual participation in
the capital of the business. This would mean considerable enlargement
of the scope of the Fund's action.
All applications ought to be made through the government (s) of the
country (ies) where the investment is to be realized.0 8 The purpose of
this requirement is twofold. First, the governments are supposed to make
a preliminary selection among the applications. Second, when a govern-
ment recommends a project for the approval of the Management Com-
mittee, it thereby acknowledges its responsibility to reimburse the Fund
in case the borrower fails to pay his creditor.
The second step is taken by the Secretary of the Fund who examines
the project from an economic, financial, and technical standpoint. The
purpose of this second examination is to make sure that the venture will
be profitable and sound enough to bear the burden of the proposed bor-
rowing. 69
Finally, the Management Committee approves the application and is-
sues the guarantee of the Fund. Art. 3, para. 2 of the Convention requires
the maintenance of a ratio of 10% between the nominal resources of the
Fund and the total amount of guarantees granted. In case this percentage
appears to be about to drop, the Committee should hold an emergency
meeting in order to take "appropriate measures" to cope with this situa-
tion.7 0 In relation to the problem of the procedural requirements, one
might question whether the Fund, through the Management Committee,
could subordinate the grant of a guarantee to the modification of a
Member Country of its investment laws. The answer to this question is
negative. Nothing in the Convention authorizes any of the organs of
the Fund to take into consideration factors other than the economic
soundness and the financial profitability (or viability in the case of a
public investment) of the proposed project.
The key element of the system is the "financial institution of inter-
68. Bylaws, Art. 19.
69. Note 39 supra, at 5.
70. The phrase "appropriate measures" probably means additional contribution.
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national reputation" which holds the nominal resources of the Fund
and to which the Committee, immediately after having issued a guaran-
tee, gives a previous and irrevocable order to pay the creditor's claims
within thirty days should the debtor fail to pay.
Since the guarantee deals with loans, it covers the risk of nonpayment
as a matter of course. Art. 4 para. 2 of the Convention, together with
Art. 23 of the bylaws, explicitly states that, in case of the debtor's failure
to pay, the Fund shall pay the lender the sum due and unpaid at the
installment date stated in the table of amortization. The annuities of
the table of amortization deal not only with the principal of the loan but
also with the interest which is covered by the guarantee. Unlike the
system of protection of direct investments, the determination of the
foreign owner's rights are here very easy to make: thirty days at the most
after the unpaid installment is due, the Fund will act through its
depository.
All contracts with foreign lenders stipulate that all risks of nonpay-
ment are covered by the guarantee.71
First, there are the so-called political risks. These include nationaliza-
tion of the borrowing enterprise without acknowledgement of its debts,
war or civil disturbance, or any kind of creeping expropriation which
makes it impossible for the borrower to pay its debts. The risk of non-
transferability of foreign currencies is also included in the category of
noncommercial risks. The guarantee against this risk, as is provided for
by the Fund, is especially important from a lender's standpoint. In
fact, protection against these political risks is offered to investors in all
national systems of guarantee for direct investments.
The major innovation brought about by the guarantee of the Fund is
its coverage of commercial risks as well as noncommercial risks. The
effect of the system is to guarantee that the creditor will recover his in-
vestments and the interest on it, regardless of the cause for the debtor's
failure to pay. Nor is it material when the nonpayment occurs - in-
demnification by the Fund is automatic.
C. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE GUARANTEE
The Convention and the bylaws of the Fund contain few specific pro-
visions dealing with the problem of the legal relationships created by
the granting of a guarantee. These relationships are in fact rather
sophisticated insofar as five different parties are involved in each case:
the lender, the borrower, the government of the country in which the
investment is made, the Fund, and the bank that holds the resources of
71. Letter from P. Kaya, the Administrative Secretary of the Fund, to the author,
Jan. 12, 1970.
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the Fund. The nature of the contractual links which exist among them is
stated in much detail in each case handled by the Fund.72 All cases,
however, are handled according to the same five-step pattern which can
be described as follows.
First, there is the basic agreement between the Fund and a financial
institution of international reputation where a deposit account is opened.
Thus far, the bank chosen by the Fund has been the French Banque
Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale located in Paris. But nothing
prevents the Fund from depositing its resources in another bank which
would offer a better rate of interest.
Second, there is the loan contract itself, which is the object of the
guarantee of the Fund.
Third, we find a counter-security agreement entered into by the gov-
ernment of the country in which the investment is to be made, in favor
of the Fund.
Fourth, there is the grant of the guarantee provided for by the Fund
to the lender.
Finally, the Fund and the borrower must sign an agreement in which
the rights and obligations of the parties are spelled out.73 The Fund
will honor the borrower's debts whenever this is necessary. The obliga-
tions of the borrower in consideration for this are threefold. He will
pay the Fund an annual fee which in no case shall exceed 0.50% of the
guaranteed amount. He will provide the Fund with an annual report
on the financial situation of the enterprise and on the progress of the
investment financed through the guaranteed loan. 74 He will also make
every effort to pay the interest and reimburse the principal as stipulated
in the loan contract.7 5
These five contracts or agreements create a rather complicated net-
work of relationships between the Fund and the other parties. The
central issue in this matter is to determine the nature of the relationship
existing between the Fund and the lender on the one hand and between
the Fund and the borrower on the other hand.
Vis-h-vis the lender, the system is well organized to make the guarantee
operate automatically as soon as the debtor's failure to pay occurs.
The obligation of the Fund is secured in cash at an international bank
as required by Art. 3, para. 2 of the Convention. Moreover, Arts. 11 and
12 specify that as long as the obligation of the Fund is not satisfied, the
deposits in cash may not be withdrawn or shared even in the case of the
72. Id.
73. Bylaws, Art. 28, para. 2.
74. Bylaws, Art. 26.
75. Bylaws, Art. 29, para. 2. The legal value of this particular provision seems to be
rather weak.
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withdrawal of a Member State or of the dissolution of the Fund. These
provisions are very significant; they mean that the creditor is offered a
real (as opposed to personal) pledge, held by a third party external to
the Entente Group countries. Furthermore, since the pledge is made in
French francs, there should be no difficulty as to its actual execution.
This type of relationship can be compared to the trustor/trustee rela-
tionship in Anglo-American law. The Fund stands in the position of a
settlor, the international bank being the trustee and the lender the
beneficiary. The Civil Code countries in general and France in particular
do not have the concept of trusteeship. The above described relationship,
however, can be compared to a "stipulation pour autrui," which is
analogous to a trust in this particular case. Art. 29 of the bylaws of the
Fund sets forth the basic condition for automatic payment by the bank.
This condition is to be found in the thirty-day rule, which provides
that once the lender has proved that the installment has not been paid
within this period of time, the bank has the duty to pay him directly.
In case of the bank's failure to do so, the lender could bring an action
against it on the theory that a beneficiary has the right to seek to en-
force a stipulation made on his behalf.76 Finally, it is noteworthy that
because of the "previous and irrevocable order to pay" made to the holder
of the pledge, the Fund is in a worse position than an ordinary guarantor.
It seems, for instance, that he cannot present the defense of the nullity
of the loan contract, which is generally allowed.77
As a guarantor, the Fund has recourse of action against the defaulting
debtor. In this respect, Art. 29, para. 3 of the bylaws stipulates that the
Administrative Secretary has to ask the bank for a "quitance subroga-
tive" - a certificate of payment - so that the Fund can be subrogated
to the lender's right to be reimbursed. But in fact, it seems that such a
subrogation claim is very weak compared to the automatic guarantee
which operates on behalf of the lender.
Theoretically, the Fund can first proceed against the borrower him-
self. This is the usual rule in the law of guarantees, and the Fund could
invoke it even though it is not specifically provided for in the Convention
and even if it were not mentioned in the agreement made between the
Fund and the borrower.78 It seems unlikely, however, that the Fund
would go itself against the debtor because the debtor's failure to pay
might indicate his insolvency; and the Fund might prefer to use the
course of action it has against the State which gave a counter-guarantee
and let it deal directly with its resident.
76. See C. Civ., Arts. 1120-21. This statement is made, of course, on the assumption
that a French bank holds the Fund's assets.
77. L. MfAzEAUD, LEcONS DE DROIT CIVIL 35 (1963).
78. PLANIOL, FiPERT Ex SAVATIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIs 991 (1954).
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The counter-guarantee given by the government of the country in
which the investment is made is an essential cog in the machinery. It
should be noted, first, that the Member States have no direct obligation
vis-h-vis the lenders even if the fund has been depleted by prior payouts.
In this situation, appropriate measures are to be taken by the Manage-
ment Committee, as mentioned earlier.79 However, the obligations of
the State vis-A1-vis the Fund are very precise and stringent. In addition to
the basic counter-guarantee required in Art. 4, para. 1 of the Conven-
tion, the State must budget every year for the interest and the principal
outstanding on the loan.8 0 Furthermore, the counter-guarantee agreement
must set forth the maximum period within which the government will
reimburse the Fund; in no case may this period exceed three months.8'
In spite of these rather strict regulations, the power of the Fund to
compel State indemnification seems rather theoretical. The only efficient
course of action it can take is provided for in Art. 4, para. 3 of the Con-
vention: the denial of examination of new applications sponsored by the
State which has not satisfied its debt to the Fund. It is too soon to say
whether or not this will provide the Fund with adequate influence.
Likewise, it is still difficult to appraise accurately the value and ef-
ficiency of the overall network of contractual relationships between the
Fund and the other parties. The prime concern of the creators of the
Fund was to offer foreign capital holders the maximum security through
an unequivocal guarantee. They achieved this through a rather complex
system of contractual relationships. Moreover, further difficulties may
arise as to the interpretation or the execution of the contracts. Therefore
we must face the problem of determining what jurisdiction will be com-
petent and what law will be applicable.
It is not difficult to establish that the guarantee granted by the Fund
as well as the legal relationships thereunder are international by nature.
First, the guarantee is international in its sources: the Convention and the
bylaws which regulate its mechanism were set up through the cooperation
of five States. Second, the guarantee is operated by an "6tablissement
public international."82 Above all, the guarantee is international "ratione
materiae" insofar as it is integrated in a series of contractual relationships
which involve parties of different nationalities: a loan contract between
a borrower resident in the Entente Group area and an outside lender;
a guarantee granted to the latter by the Fund and a counter-guarantee
given to the Fund by a State; the deposit by the Fund of its resources,
in French francs, at an outside bank.
79. See note 70 supra.
80. Bylaws, Art. 25, paras. 1 and 2.
81. Bylaws, Art. 25, para. 2.
82. H. Adam, supra note 55.
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It is true that specific documents, such as the constitutive Convention,
the bylaws, and the contracts themselves, are designed to regulate the
operation of the Fund and its relationships with other parties. Neverthe-
less, we cannot assert that no possibility of litigation remains; and there-
fore we must consider the problem of finding competent judges and
applicable laws. This question ought to be approached from the view-
point of the different relationships existing among the parties, e.g., the
Member States-Fund relationship, the Fund-lender relationship, the
Fund-borrower relationship, or the bank-lender relationship.
Art. 3 of the Annex on Privileges and Immunities which is attached to
the Convention sets forth the requirements to be met by a court in order
to obtain jurisdiction over the Fund. It says that "actions may be brought
against the Fund only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the terri-
tories of a member in which the Fund has an office, has appointed an
agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process or
has issued or guarantee securities." In the present situation, there are
no courts but those of Abidjan - the city where the headquarters of the
organization are located - that fulfill the requirements enunciated in
this provision.8 3 In practice, however, this provision may have different
effect depending on the parties dealing with the Fund.
The State which counter-guarantees the loan cannot bring an action
against the Fund since para. 3 of Art. 3 of the Annex expressly states that
"no judicial action shall be brought against the Fund by the Member
States or by persons allegedly subrogated in the rights of the Member
States."
The borrower is strictly bound by the rule of jurisdiction of Art. 3
of the Annex. There is no doubt that a Dahomean court, for instance,
would not have jursidiction on a suit brought before it by a Dahomean
borrower against the Fund. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the
theory of the superiority of a treaty over national laws.8 4
The actual effect of this role of jurisdiction might be different from
the foreign lender's viewpoint. In the absence of any clause of jurisdiction
in the guarantee contract, an Italian bank, for example, could very well
sue the Fund before an Italian court since Italian courts are not bound
by the Convention creating the Fund. The major problem would then
be for the plaintiff to enforce the judgment - in France, for instance,
against the assets of the Fund which are held by a French bank. Al-
83. By a resolution of July 1969, the Council decided on the building of new offices
at Lome (Togo}. When this is done the Togolese tribunals will have competent
jurisdiction over the Fund.
84. This principle is expressed in Art. 56 of the constitutions of Dahomey, Ivory
Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta, and in Art. 57 of the constitution of Togo.
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though no precedent dealing with this particular type of situation can be
found in French law, there is no reason why a court would not recognize
the judgment of the Italian court. From the lender's standpoint, another
solution to bring a valid action in Italy would be to stipulate in the con-
tract of guarantee that the Fund shall deposit the total amount or part
of the amount of the capital guaranteed in an Italian bank "of inter-
national reputation" in the sense of Art. 3 of the Convention. In this
case, the problem of the enforcement of an Italian judgment against the
assets of the Fund would be solved.
The rules of jurisdiction mentioned above do not prevent the parties
from stipulating in the contract that a dispute would be submitted to
international arbitration. An interesting question in this respect is to
determine whether they could refer to the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investments Disputes.8 5 Art. 25 of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investments Disputes reads:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision
or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent
in writing to submit to the Centre ....
In this particular case, the" "ratione materiae" test seems to raise little
difficulty. The dispute would not involve an investment, strictly speak-
ing, but would arise directly out of an investment in the sense of Art. 25.
It is generally acknowledged that portfolio investments fall within the
scope of the general concept of "investment."8' 6
The "ratione personae" test might be more controversial. In fact, the
dispute would not directly involve one State and the national of another
State since the Fund constitutes a screen between them. We can think
of eliminating this obstacle. We can consider the Fund as "an agency of
a Contracting State". It would suffice, then, for the five governments of
the Entente Group to designate the Fund as such to the authorities of
the Centre to comply with the requirement. Another possibility would be
to specify in the arbitration clause of the contract that, in case of litiga-
tion, the parties would be the private lender on the one hand and the
State assisted or represented by the Fund on the other.
The choice of law problem in the Fund-lender relationship is a diffi-
cult one to resolve when a disagreement arises. First, it must be said that
fear of the unknown or of the uncertain usually leads international
lenders to give special interest to including a choice of law clause in the
loan contract 8 7 In the particular case with which we are dealing, it ap-
85. The five countries of the Entente Group signed and ratified the Convention.
86. M. AfAIO, LE CONTENTIEUX INTERNATIONAL DE L'INVESTISSEMENT PRIvE 97 (1967).
87. See G. DELAUME. LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC )r-
VELOPMENT FINANCING 79 (1967).
1971/Guarantee Fund
pears that the lenders usually expressly refer to French law.88 We must
assume, however, that such stipulation may not be stated in the con-
tract; and we thus face the problem of determining what law would be
applied by both the Entente and foreign courts.
The application of the law of the country where the investment is
made has sometimes been suggested by international and national
tribunals. In the Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases, the Permanent Court
of International Justice assumed that a special rule of conflict of laws
should be applied in respect to private loans to public parties and pre-
sumed that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, public
parties intended to contract under their own law.8 9 The same solution
was reached by the French Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Seine in
an analogous situation.90 Also, Art. 42 of the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investments Disputes between States and nationals of other
States provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its
rules on the conflict of laws) ....
This solution, however, can be easily challenged. First, precedents exist
denying the right of a State to have its law applied when it enters into
a contract with a private party.9' This is particularly relevant where the
State is not directly involved in the contract, as is the case here. Further-
more, the advantage of the simplicity that this solution would present
will no longer exist when several States are associated in the same venture,
as is likely to happen in the future.
In response to this last argument, one might suggest the application
of the common legal principles of the area. As already mentioned, the
five countries of the Group have adopted a similar constitutional pro-
vision whereby the French legal system is maintained. This theory was
in fact put into practice when twelve French speaking countries created
the international corporation Air Afrique in 1961.92 Art. 2 of the certifi-
cate of incorporation stipulates "the corporation is subject to the treaty,
to the certificate of incorporation and to the common legal principles
applicable in the Member States". This solution has the disadvantage of
uncertainty insofar as the domestic laws of the Members of the Group
might very well diverge in the future.
88. Letter from P. Kaya, the Administrative Secretary of the Fund, to the author,
Jan. 12, 1970.
89. Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, [1929] P.C.IJ., ser. A, Nos. 21 and 22.
90. Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Seine, June 1, 1966, 56 REVUE CRmTQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRvE 715 (1967)
91. See C. Cass. civ. May 31, 1932, REC. DALLOZ P. 1933, 1, 169. See also H.
BATIXFFOL, TRArrA ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 585 (1959.
92. J. TARDY-JOUBERT, LA SOCIETE AIR AFRIQUE 113 (1968).
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It is likely, therefore, that the judge will try to find the most adequate
national law and, in order to do so, will research the most significant
connecting factor in the guarantee contract. The place of negotiation
and the place of signature of the contract must be considered. However,
insofar as they may vary from one instance to another, no precise con-
clusion can be drawn therefrom. Actually, as is often the case in absence
of specific provision stipulated by the parties, the place of performance
would probably be considered as the center of gravity of the contract.93
Since the guarantee is to be performed by the bank which holds the assets
of the Fund, it seems reasonable to apply the law of the country where
the bank is located.
We can assume that insofar as most tribunals have refused to follow
the theory enunciated in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases, the ap-
plication of the law of the State (s) where the investment is made would
be rejected.94 In this respect, the discovery of the intent of the parties or
of the most significant factor would probably lead most of the tribunals
to apply the law of the place of performance of the guarantee, that is
to say, the place where the bank is located.95
Determination of the applicable law raises little difficulty. The com-
mon legal principles of the area could easily be referred to at least so
long as the five national contract legislations do not diverge substantially.
If they do, the judge would have to apply national law. It seems rea-
sonable to designate Ivorian law since the negotiation, the signature, and
the most significant obligations of the parties such as the payment of
the premiums and the reports to be made by the borrower take place
at the headquarters of the Fund in Abidjan. Furthermore, insofar as the
Ivorian courts are the courts of competent jurisdiction, the application
of the lex fori would offer a great practical advantage.
D. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FUND TO PROTECTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
West African countries have used different techniques to determine
the scope of incentive programs. But in almost all cases, commercial
activities are excluded from the benefits of the program. Niger is the
only West African country which classifies commercial activities among
"priority enterprises".9 6 This trend is generally justified by the over-
93. This test prevails in most European legal systems. See H. BATIIFFOL, supra note 91,
at 641.
94. Sommers, Broches and Delaume, Conflict Avoidance in International Loans and
Monetary Agreements, 21 LAw & CONEaNIP. PROB. 463 (1956).
95. This test is deemed to be one of the most significant both in the continental legal
systems and in the Anglo-American system. See, e.g., RSTATEM ENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICTS OF LAWS (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, 1968).
96. Law No. 61-21 (July 1961), as amended, Art. I of Law No. 63-6 (Feb. 1, 1963).
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development of the commercial sector compared to the industrial sector.
Art. 2 of the Convention includes commercial investments among
eligible investments for a loan guarantee. The reason for this new policy
is that the Member Countries of the Fund realize that some types of com-
mercial investments can contribute a great deal to the overall develop-
ment of the economy.
Likewise, by guaranteeing loans the Fund helps to eliminate the arti-
ficial distinction which is often made in the West African codes between
direct investments and portfolio investments. The Senegalese code is the
only one that provides foreign loans with protection when these loans
finance projects which are deemed to be economically desirable. The
framers of all other codes seem to have believed that there is no direct
relation between a financial credit and an investment. Therefore, by
encouraging the inflow of foreign loans in the Entente Group area, the
Fund has made a positive contribution to the question of determining
which forms of foreign capital participation can contribute to the growth
of a less developed economy.
The foreign capital holder's prime concern is a profitable business
investment. For him, the relevant question is to determine whether the
advantages offered by the Fund are the greatest he can find. In this
respect, we can say that, in the limited area of foreign loans protection,
the Fund provides investors greater advantages than guarantee programs
of capital exporting countries.
Most other programs do not cover commercial risks. The United
States Investment Guarantee Act authorizes the President to issue guaran-
ties to eligible investors to assure protection against "inability to con-
vert into United States dollars other currencies or credits in such cur-
rencies, . . . loss of investment due to expropriation or confiscation by
action of a foreign government, . . . loss due to war, revolution or insur-
rection." 97 In fact, an Extended Risk Guarantee Program exists, under
which the commercial risks of an investment are protected.98 But in the
case of long-term loans, only 75% of the principal and interest may be
covered.09 Furthermore, it seems that the application of this extended
program has remained rather limited and is not available to all countries
that subscribed to the political risk program.100
No other guarantee program in the world covers investments whether
direct or portfolio against nonpolitical risks. Even West Germany's pro-
97. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2181 (b) (1> (B) (1964.)
98. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2181 (b). See C. FULDA & W.
SCHwARTZ, supra note 3, at 711-14 (1970).
99. See C. FUrLDA &, W. SCHWARTz, supra note 3, at 711-14 (1970>.
100. Id. Niger, for example, is absent from the list of countries where the Extended
Risk Guarantee Program is available.
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gram, which is the most advanced outside the United States, restricts
the scope of the coverage to noncommercial risks.1 1 Therefore, the
absolute and automatic guarantee which is granted by the Fund must
constitute a substantial advantage from the lender's standpoint.
Also, under the programs of capital exporting countries, the investor
has to pay an annual fee which, in some instances, may go up to 2% of
the value of the protected investment.102 In this respect, it is noteworthy
that the guarantee granted by the Fund is free of cost for the foreign
lender; Art. 5, para. 4 of the Convention specifies that the guarantee
fee is to be paid by the borrower.
The question can be raised whether it would be possible to extend the
Fund's guarantee to direct investments. It is not possible to give a pre-
cise answer at the moment, but this extension seems unlikely in the near
future. In fact, the Fund was conceived to complement the investment
codes of the five Member Countries. The guarantee it provides to foreign
capital lenders is designed to encourage local entrepreneurs in the area.
Therefore, by extending the guarantee to foreign direct investments, the
Fund would deviate somewhat from its major mission. Moreover, insofar
as such an evolution would, to a certain extent, substitute the Fund
for the domestic codes of the five countries, this would necessitate a
strong political willingness on the part of the Member States to achieve
economic integration. It is probably too soon to speculate on this matter.
A possible enlargement of the system to other African countries can
be envisioned through two different mechanisms. It could be either the
enlargement of the Fund itself to the eighteen African countries which
are associated with the European Economic Community or the creation of
regional funds between States which are already linked by regional co-
operation agreements such as the Economic Union of Central Africa or
the Common African and Malgasy Organization.' 03 The former solution
would offer the advantage of fitting the Fund into the overall association
agreement made with the Countries of the Common Market. But the
system probably would be looser than that of the Entente Group Fund,
where only five countries are involved. The latter solution would be
101. Stikker, The Role of Private Enterprise in Investment and Promotion of Exports
in Developing Countries, UNCTAD TD/35/Supp. 1, at 63 (Nov. 1967).
102. Id. Premiums vary; and rates offered include 0.A7% in Japan, 0.80% in West
Germany, 0.25% to 1.75% in the United States, and 0.30% to 2% in Netherland, de-
pending on the kind and the scope of insurance given.
103. Members of the E.U.C.A. are Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo
(Brazzaville), and Gabon. The organization, created in 1966, is designed to achieve a
free trade area and possibly a customs union. Members of the C.A.M.O. are Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Malgasy Republic, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, and Mauritania. Founded in
1965, the organization is designed to reinforce solidarity and economic cooperation
among the member states.
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easier to set up but would have less political and economic impact vis-5-vis
the European Economic Community as well as foreign investors.
IV. THE FUND'S CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION
As we have seen earlier, the Foreign Loan Guarantee and Mutual
Assistance Fund is an "6tablissement public international". One of the
legal features of this type of international organization is to be found
in the "special purpose" that each of them must be assigned to achieve.
The Fund's specific purpose, as stated in Art. 2 of the Convention, is to
guarantee foreign loans designed to finance agricultural, industrial, or
commercial investments. By 1968, however, the Fund had broadened the
scope of its activities. Beside granting guarantees, it has undertaken to
stimulate and eventually sponsor a variety of endeavors by the Member
States to improve economic research and coordination of national
projects.
One might raise the question whether this enlargement of activities is
consistent with the specific purpose for which the Fund was created.
In fact, the Preamble of the Convention spells out the goals of the Fund
in such broad terms as "to coordinate the efforts of the Member
States in order to promote rapid economic growth."' 04 The concept of
"&ablissement public international" is flexible enough to make possible
an extension of the activities of the Fund as long as this does not con-
flict with the objectives it has to pursue. An example of this flexibility
can be found in the evolution of the European Investment Bank, an
&ablissement public international, created under Art. 129 of the Eco-
nomic European Community Treaty. The initial task of this Bank was
to grant loans to projects for converting enterprises or for creating new
activities which are called for by the gradual establishment of the Com-
mon Market. Since 1963, however, the Bank has been involved in the
assistance program offered by the EEC to the less developed associated
countries.105
In the preface to the 1968 annual report on the activities of the Fund,
Mr. H. Diori, President of the Republic of Niger, stressed that "while
the financial guarantees constitute the major aspect of the action of the
Fund, 1968 is characterized by the role the Fund played in the field of
economic cooperation among the Member Countries."
Since each of the five countries of the Entente Group has a small
population and a narrow domestic market, it is important that each of
them take into account in its investment policy the major investments
104. Preamble, para. 4.
105. E. STEIN AND P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 409 (1967).
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realized in the area. Up to 1966, however, no organization or committee
whatsoever existed within the Group to facilitate any sort of coordina-
tion of national projects. This is a reason why the Fund undertook this
kind of action. It stands in a good position to conduct or supervise eco-
nomic studies. This part of its activities is actually closely related to its
basic financial mission. Insofar as it is designed to facilitate the financing
of profitable economic projects, it can help research the best possibilities
and try to maximize their usefulness by preventing duplication in the
area of the Group. This new role of the Fund was officially acknowl-
edged by the five Chiefs of State at a meeting of the Council held in
Ouagadougou in November, 1968.106 While it is true that the Fund can-
not afford to finance expensive economic studies, it stands in a better
position than the individual governments to obtain technical and
financial assistance from foreign countries or international organizations.
The United States, through the Agency for International Development,
and France, through the Aid and Cooperation Fund, have already pro-
vided the Fund with assistance to conduct economic studies. The annual
report for 1968 stresses that contacts were recently established with the
World Bank Group.
In 1968, the Fund undertook to conduct an economic study on live-
stock, one of the most important products of the area. Two outside
countries, Mali and Ghana, have been associated with the Group for the
purpose of this market study. Niger, Upper Volta, and Mali are tradi-
tional producer countries whereas Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Togo, and
Ghana import their needs in livestock from the former countries. The
purpose of the study is twofold. The first is to determine, from a general
standpoint, the situation and the prospects of the livestock market in
the area; this part of the study was financed by the French ACF and
conducted by a French corporation. The second part of the study is
designed to research the possibilities of creating meat processing plants;
it was financed by the United States AID and assigned to an American
company.107 The major idea underlying this operation is to determine
the best locations for the plants so far as profitability and usefulness for
the whole area are concerned. The final report was completed by the end
of 1970 and was submitted to the Council in 1971.108 After studying the
report's recommendations, the Council will have to decide on its course
of action.
This same type of endeavor to coordinate national investment policies
was made by the Fund with regard to the cement production. Important
106. ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY, REPORT ON THE FUND'S AcnvTIES FOR 1968, at 9.
107. Thomas Miner Co. from Chicago.
108. ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY, 2 BULLETIN D'INFORMATION 7 (Jan. 1970).
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deposits of limestone were recently discovered both in Dahomey and in
Togo. The problem is that the market is too narrow to support several
big plants even though the Ivory Coast can absorb substantial quanti-
ties of cement. In 1968, the Fund caused the creation of a joint venture in
which the government of Dahomey, the government of Togo, and two
private companies are associated to determine the best possible location
of the plant (s) as well as the capacity.
The third sector in which encouraging results have been obtained is
tourism. On the proposal of the Administrative Secretary of the Fund,
the Council passed in January 1968 a resolution whereby an Interstate
Technical Council for Tourism in the Entente Group was created. This
Council is designed to determine and promote a common policy for the
development of tourism in the area. The 1968 resolution states that the
Management Committee of the Fund shall pay the closest possible atten-
tion to the applications for guarantee which will be related to a project
recommended by the Council for the development of tourism.
These three examples illustrate the avenues of action chosen by the
Fund to extend economic coordination among the Member States. It
has already been suggested that it should undertake to coordinate the
development plans of the five countries. 0 9 In this respect, it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that the proper operation of the Fund will inevitably
lead to some sort of coordination of the economic policies of the member
countries, for one of the purposes of the Fund is to promote complemen-
tary projects in the area of the Group. It is likely, however, that this
effort will be made through a functional approach rather than a formal
or active process since the Fund has no power to influence directly the
preparation or the implementation of the national development plans.
On January 12, 1967, the Management Committee of the Fund created
an "Intervention Budget", the purpose of which is to assist the States in
financing the preparation of projects that will eventually be submitted
to the Fund for the granting of a guarantee or to an international or-
ganization such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. This Budget is financed by the interest of the Fund's capital
after deduction of the operation costs of the Administrative Secretary.
The sum thus collected is still small (19 million francs CFA in 1969) 110
but is going to grow in proportion of the increase of the overall capital.
The distinction existing between the "economic coordination" activi-
ties of the Fund and its "technical assistance" activities ought to be
emphasized. In the former case, the Fund conducts or supervises economic
studies of common interest for the Group but does not itself finance the
109. Letter, supra note 88.
110. ADiNirRSTmwE SEcRETARY, supra note 108, at 5.
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operation whereas in the latter case it directly sponsors the preparation
of a particular project.
In 1967, the government of Niger entered into a contract with the
British corporation Balkhany Ltd. to establish a water detection program.
The cost of the operation, $320,000, was to be spread over a 3-year period.
The first annuity was paid by Niger in 1968; but, in order to spread the
debt of this country over a longer period, the Fund agreed to pay the
two next installments. Niger is to reimburse the Fund in 1971 and 1972.
In 1968, the Fund financed the technical study related to the second
agro-industrial complex for which a loan guarantee was granted in 1969.
This is the type of action that the Fund should emphasize in the future.
Since the resources available for this Intervention Budget will remain
rather limited, it cannot really diversify the range of its assistance pro-
gram. Consequently, it seems that the most useful action it could under-
take in this respect is to help in financing the preliminary studies of
projects which are eligible for a loan guarantee.
V. CONCLUSION
Several observations can be drawn from the study of the Foreign Loan
Guarantee and Mutual Assistance Fund of the Entente Group.
The contribution of the Fund to the problem of the protection of
foreign capital in developing countries is significant but restricted to a
limited area. The stringent obligations taken towards foreign capital
holders by the Member Countries through the Fund are acceptable to
them because of the actual community of interest that exists among them
at the level of the regional grouping. Developing countries have to face
the problem of striking a balance between the need for foreign capital
and the willingness to preserve national independence, between the in-
centives designed to attract an inflow of capital and the regulations de-
signed to control foreign ownership. The creation of the Fund is an
attempt by five countries to use the regional approach to help strike this
balance; the granting of a multinational loan guarantee on the one hand
and the local ownership requirement on the other hand are the two
major techniques used by the Fund in this respect.
It is noteworthy that whereas all other plans for protection of foreign
capital are sponsored by capital-exporting countries, the resources of the
Fund are mostly of African origin. This indicates the concern existing
among the countries of the Conseil de l'Entente to contribute to the
solution the problem of the protection of foreign investments.
The Fund's scope of action is rather limited, however, since it deals
only with foreign loans designed to finance enterprises run by domestic
investors. This is the reason why the guarantee can be "simple, reliable
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and administratively fast moving". A system of protection of direct in-
vestments cannot be based upon those principles for the problems are
more complicated than in the case of loans; the difficulties raised by the
evaluation of a loss or by the evaluation of the time within which an
expropriated enterprise ought to be indemnified, for instance, cannot
be treated according to the automatic system which characterizes the
operation of the Fund.
With respect to the Fund's contribution to economic cooperation
among the Entente Group countries, the most interesting aspect of the
Fund has been the informal and functional approach it has adopted to
handle the problem of economic coordination. Since its initial purpose
was a financial one, the Fund does not have specific powers to accelerate
cooperation among the five economies. However, a functional approach
seems to suit well the present needs of West African countries. The steady
increase of the Fund's resources will strengthen its role in the progress
of the Group toward economic integration. But since this role is informal
and since it is not supported by a solid legal basis, it will be subject to
the willingness of the States to let it operate properly. In this respect,
the Fund is an experimental organization. The genuine economic inte-
gration of the Entente Group economies will be made through a more
elaborate and adequate organization, but the Fund will have contributed
substantially to this achievement.

